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The long shot for Brazil 
Political support for current reforms is contingent on 
sustained growth, but the prospects for such growth 
are limited by Brazil's highly unequal distribution of 
income. 
Having succeeded in lowering monthly inflation from 
50% to around 1 -3%, the Brazilian government is 
currently attempting the second stage of its 
stabilization program. One of its main tasks is to 
undo earlier constitutional spending commitments 
which, since the late 1980s, have contributed to 
bloating government deficits and fueled Brazil's 
hyper-stagflation cycles. Unfortunately, in the case 
of Brazil, successful reform depends on more than 
political goodwill. 
Brazil has one of the most unequal distributions of 
income in the world, with the top 20% of the 
population earning more than 30 times the income of 
the bottom 20%. The effect of income distribution on 
growth is often debated by economists. On the one 
hand, income inequality helps sustain higher saving 
rates and could provide an incentive for investment, 
particularly in the early stages of development. On 
the other hand, persistent inequality restricts mass 
consumption, thus undermining domestic growth 
potential. Chart 1 suggests that, for emerging 
countries, the latter effect has been stronger than 
the former, so countries with a more equal 
distribution also tend to grow faster. 
Chart 2 shows that, in the Brazilian case, the 
negative effect of income inequality on growth was 
muted until the early 1970s. Indeed, during the 
1950s and 1960s, domestic savings (as well as 
large foreign loans) financed massive government 
investment in infrastructure and basic industries, 
helping propel the "Brazilian miracle". However, with 
the oil and debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s, 
growing incom 
e inequality turned from a blessing to a curse. 
During the "lost decade" of the 1980s, government 
investment had tumbled, and with declining 
prospects for domestic growth, private investment 
went down, too. Moreover, contrary to the earlier 
period, higher investment since the mid-1980s has 
failed to reverse the declining growth trend. 
Over the past three decades, Brazil exhibited an 
lnverse relationship between inflation and growth 
(Chart 3). Since the early 1980% the economy 
moved from high growth and relatively moderate 
inflation, to stagnation and hyperinflation. One of the 
main culprits was rapidly rising government 
spending, but this was itself more a consequence 
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than a cause: with stagnating national income, 
earnings growth was becoming increasingly 
determined by a redistributional tug-of-war over 
government revenues and spending. For example, 
federal-to-state transfers are in many cases 
channeled to municipalities created just for that 
purpose, while the now-faltering state banks of Rio 
de Janeiro (Banerj) and S%o Paulo (Banespa) have 
for years siphoned billions of dollars to various 
interest groups. A similar pattern is evident in federal 
finances. In 1991, for instance, with annual inflation 
running at "only" 434%, interest payments and 
subsidies together accounted for 63% of 
government spending, while corporate taxes 
amounted to no more than 2.8%. On balance, the 
consequence was rising income inequality and that 
is precisely why the recent "conquest" of inflation is 
far from assured. 
To retain business and middle-class support for its 
program, the Cardoso government must be able to 
replace forgone inflationary profits (the 6 largest 
banks alone earned $5.8 bn in 1993) with 
expectations for large and sustainable "growth 
dividends". So far, support has been cemented by 
the threat of social disorder (or a left-wing 
government) and fears of missing the globalization 
train; but that support could melt away -- followed by 
rising inflation -- with the first signs of renewed 
stagnation. 
In the long term, the prospects for a second 
Brazilian "takeoff' remain constrained. Unlike the 
earlier experience of government-managed growth, 
this time the engine must be private investment 
which is highly sensitive to the growth of final 
demand. Favorable external circumstances could 
help the expansion of exports, but this path is 
inherently unstable. Moreover, government 
subsidies which underwrote much of Brazil's export 
boom are bound to decline with fiscal reform. In the 
final analysis, it is the home market which offers the 
largest potential for Brazil and that has so far 
remained locked by severe income inequality. 
Investment Conclusions 
Support for current reforms will disintegrate unless 
sustainable "growth dividends" substitute for 
inflationary profits. 
Significant economic slowdown will likely bring 
higher, not lower inflation. 
The prospects for a second economic takeoff ' 
remain clouded by a highly unequal distribution of 
income. I"rl 
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